DOW-UAP-D120, AAWSAP DIRD, חומרים לפלטפורמות תעופה-חלל מתקדמות, ינואר 2010

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Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms
Prepared by:
Acquisition Support Division (DW0-3)
Defense warning Office
Directorate for Analysis
Defense Intelligence Agency
Author:
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Contents
Figures
2. Specially Modified 747 Transporter Unloading a Boeing 787 Composite
3. Micrograph Showing Phase Formation at the Surface of a Ti Alloy That has
4. Cross-Section Micrograph of a Ti Matrix Composite.......................................... 15
Tables
1. Potential Materials by Use Temperature Regime and Property ......................... 10
iii

Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms
Introduction
"Advanced aerospace platforms" is a broad topic that can be divided into
several narrower subtopics to enable a more concise discussion of materials
advances, challenges, and opportunities. Consequently, this document
discusses the areas of launch vehicles, space vehicles, and space propulsion
systems separately because their key requirements are often application
specific, which affects materials selection decisions. In addition, single-use
and reusable boosters have different durability requirements that directly
impinge on design and materials selection. Furthermore, current engineering
practice has evolved to the point that design synthesis must integrate the
structure and construction materials to achieve optimum product performance.
For example, the space shuttle was designed to meet customer-imposed
mission requirements (range, payload, empty weight, landing capability, and
so forth) without significant real-time consideration of materials capability.
This approach led to significant compromises at later stages in the shuttle's
development and maturation. (Arguably, the shuttle could be designed as a
more efficient vehicle today.) In the extreme, a spectacular engineering
failure was the National Aerospace Plane (also dubbed the Orient Express),
which was launched as a military project and was intended to be a mach 12
reusable strike vehicle. This project rapidly became materials limited and was
canceled in 1993, after about $750 million in federal R&D expenditures and a
substantial private sector investment. The point is that any "clean sheet of
paper design" must start with an assessment of the requirements for
construction materials and be accompanied by a realistic assessment of the
capability of currently available materials to meet these needs. If th…